

# FEATURE REVIEW

Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds.

**Electoral Systems and Democracy**

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press

272 pp., \$45.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper

ISBN 0-8018-8474-8 cloth

ISBN 0-8018-8475-6 paper

Publication Date: September 2006

Coles, Romand

**Beyond Gated Politics: Reflections for the Possibility of Democracy**

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

330 pp., \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper

ISBN 0-8166-4689-9 cloth

ISBN 0-8166-4690-2 paper

Publication Date: September 2005

Muñoz, Heraldo, ed.

**Democracy Rising: Assessing the Global Challenges**

Boulder, CO: Rienner

184 pp., \$37.50 cloth, \$17.95 paper

ISBN 1-58826-428-9 cloth

ISBN 1-58826-405-X paper

Publication Date: September 2005

The three books under review here aim to promote democracy. The principal criterion of judgment on which they may be evaluated is how probable it is that they will achieve that goal.

In *Electoral Systems and Democracy*, Hoover Institute Senior Fellow Larry Diamond and National Endowment for Democracy Vice President for Research and Studies Marc F. Plattner compile a collection of previously published essays on electoral systems and democratization. The first-rate scholars who composed these essays were inspired by the “powerful accumulation of theory and evidence indicating that the design of the electoral system does matter quite a lot for the nature of the party system and the character of politics and public policy” (ix). Because electoral systems can be changed “relatively quickly,” the question of which electoral systems engender more democracy ought to be of interest to political scientists, politicians, and citizens alike (5).

*Electoral Systems and Democracy* is logically divided into three sections. The first, “Electoral Systems and Institutional Design,” is a five-chapter collection of essays addressing how alternative electoral systems may further or hinder democracy. Donald L. Horowitz argues that evaluating an electoral system requires having a clear idea of “what one wants the electoral system to do” (3). Richard W. Soudriette and Andrew Ellis further argue that an electoral system must be compatible with “a country’s historical, cultural and sociological traditions” (16). Benjamin Reilly ponders the potential of an electoral system to “help democracy survive in

countries split by deep cleavages of race, religion, language, or ethnicity” (27). Arend Lijphart expounds on Reilly’s theme by discussing power sharing in democracy, while R. Kent Weaver explores how federalism relates to social cleavages, power sharing, and democracy.

Section two, “Is Proportional Representation Best?” (chapters 6–10), begins with Arend Lijphart’s seminal essay defending proportional representation, followed by subsequent chapters that are responses to Lijphart. Guy Lardeyret counters his argument by problematizing Lijphart’s methodology. Quentin L. Quade contests Lijphart’s democratic theory when he writes, “I urge plurality voting in single-member districts, hope and expect that this will encourage a two-party system, and applaud the single-party government that would result” (92). Clear, cogent, and often persuasive, the exchanges between Lijphart, Lardeyret, and Quade exemplify the key strength of *Electoral Systems and Democracy*: the productive benefits of scholarly debate.

The final section, “Country and Regional Experiences” (chapters 11–19), includes illuminating examples from South Africa, Uruguay, Latin America, Israel, Japan, Taiwan, Afghanistan, and Iraq in an attempt to resolve the two core questions of *Electoral Systems and Democracy*: Which is more democratic: proportional representation, a majoritarian system, a synthesis, or some other electoral system?; Ought the choice of a particular electoral system be contingent on contextual variables? While *Electoral Systems and Democracy* offers no definitive answers,

the book exposes the reader to research and exceptional arguments that are accessible to citizens and scholars alike. It is probable that the book could promote democracy—either by persuading citizens to vote for or against proportional representation, or by informing the discretion of political scientists overseeing the drafting of a constitution.

Whereas *Electoral Systems and Democracy* is narrowly focused, Duke University political theorist and radical Democrat Romand Coles’s *Beyond Gated Politics* is broader in scope. An opponent of liberal democracy, Coles begins by critiquing liberal theorists from John Locke to John Rawls in his first two chapters. In chapters 3 and 4, Coles endeavors to show how Alasdair MacIntyre and John Yoder highlight inadequacies of the liberal tradition and offer potential revisions. The remaining chapters address how feminism, grassroots activism, and education may facilitate radical democracy.

Despite the author’s pragmatic intent, *Beyond Gated Politics* tends toward metademocratic theorizing. By this I mean theorizing about democracy with an overemphasis on theoretical abstraction and an insufficient concomitant emphasis on democratic institutions, practices, and politics. Consistent with the metademocratic style is Coles’s neologistic, metaphoric clutter of phrases (e.g., “tension-dwelling,” “receptive traveling,” “ecstatic conjuring of utopic possibility,” “Dionysian events,” “politics of nepantlist generosity”). Readers may be bewildered by the jargon permeating Coles’s scholarship.

Metademocratic tendencies aside, the redeeming aspect of *Beyond Gated Politics* is its effort to “explore modes of radical democratic judgment and action” to “bring an edgy political world into being” (xiii). The connection between democratic theory and practice is most effectively addressed in chapter 7, “Moving Democracy: The Political Arts of Listening, Traveling, and Tabling,” where Coles argues that “[d]emocratic theory ought to develop significantly . . . in dialogical and more receptive encounters with democratic struggles” (214). Moreover, he writes that “democratic theory and democratic practice must both cultivate their capacities to sharply criticize one another” (215). One example of such an engagement is his analysis of Saul Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). To Coles, the participatory democratic characteristic of the IAF offers an opportunity to “rework the lenses through which . . . theorists often interpret politics” (216).

But is Coles’s text likely to promote democracy? Given his approach—a technical analysis of political thinkers like MacIntyre, Yoder, Rawls, and Jacques Derrida—it is unlikely that it will be either appealing or accessible to anyone but academics. Unfortunately, those who are likely to read Coles’s book are not active citizens, political officials, or empirically minded political scientists; political theorists are his target audience, and it is precisely their notorious inability to affect political practice that will render Coles’s effort ineffectual.

*Democracy Rising: Assessing the Global Challenges* is a collection of essays published by the Community of Democracies—an organization composed of over a hundred nation-states committed to the spread of democracy globally. This book is similar to *Electoral Systems and Democracy*, but in this instance the contributors are political officials of various kinds—not professional academics. Unlike the latter book’s focus on alternative electoral systems and their relation to the quality of democracy, *Democracy Rising* offers a much less thematic compilation. Instead of addressing a specific aspect of democratization, the text is organized around the somewhat tenuous objective to further the Community of Democracies’ mission by “helping to turn aspirations for democracy into a concrete and growing reality throughout the world” (8). The first section, “Democracy Today” (chapters 2–5), addresses general issues of democratization, including sustainability, the role of the United Nations, the need for a common definition and plan for democratization, and the importance of nongovernmental and civic organizations. Section two, “Democracy in the Regions” (chapters 6–15), examines democratization

in Asian Pacific, African, Arabian, European, and Latin American contexts. Section three, “The Future of Democracy” (chapters 16 and 17), concludes the book with a chapter on democracy and globalization and an essay by Francis Fukuyama.

The emphasis on actual existing political regimes and real-world political issues is commendable. It is clear that the contributors are pragmatic political officials who approach their subject matter in a way that only political officials can. Consider José Ramos-Horta’s discussion of democracy in the Asia Pacific, which addresses some of the key challenges for the Asia Pacific region that must be met if democracy is to thrive. He identifies several key challenges: poverty, disengagement of the military from the political economy, the professionalism of political parties, human rights, press freedom, and human resources development (46–48). The relevance and recognition of these challenges are unmistakably borne out of Ramos-Horta’s direct involvement in East Timor’s struggle on the road to democratization.

Although political officials have much prudential wisdom to contribute to a book on democratic development, they are predictably unaware of democratic theory. Just as some contemporary democratic theory—like *Beyond Gated Politics*—suffers from a metademocratic tendency, *Democracy Rising* lacks theoretical sophistication. This ignorance is signaled to the reader when the editor notes that “The post–Cold War debate on democracy has permitted us to leave behind the old debate between ‘real democracy’ and ‘formal democracy’” (2). I suspect political theorists will disagree.

The structure of the book is also problematic. For one, the book lacks a strong thematic coherence. The contributors all obviously value democracy, but that shared value enables this book to hang together only tenuously. Moreover, many of the essays are underdeveloped. For instance, Abdulkarim Al-Eryani’s contribution, “Democracy in the Arab World” (chapter 10), is a scant three pages. Oddly, the critical companion commentary essay to Al-Eryani’s chapter is longer. Given the contentious issue of democracy in the Arab world, one expects elaboration. Lamentable brevity is characteristic of the essays in this collection.

*Democracy Rising* is a superb idea for a book, but its execution leaves much to be desired—too much, indeed, to warrant recommendation. As for *Beyond Gated Politics*, I fear that it too cannot be recommended to anyone other than political theorists—and even then only reservedly. *Electoral Systems and Democracy*, however, will be valuable to undergraduate

and graduate students and scholars who seek to understand how electoral systems can, and do, affect democracy. I would, however, supplement that text with a work on the political theory of representation—perhaps Nadia Urbinati’s *Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy* (2006). Of the three books on democracy reviewed herein, *Electoral Systems and Democracy* offers the greatest potential to advance democratization.

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Velásquez, Eduardo  
**A Consumer’s Guide to the  
Apocalypse: Why There Is No  
Cultural War in America and Why  
We Will Perish Nonetheless**  
Wilmington, DE: ISI Books  
200 pp., \$22.00, ISBN: 9781933859286  
Publication Date: July 2007

“We are what we ingest,” says Eduardo Velásquez in the introduction to *A Consumer’s Guide to the Apocalypse*, a small book examining “America’s dissolution” through the lens of popular entertainment (xx). Velásquez is a master of “pregnant silences” and “purposeful omissions” (155), and throughout the deceptively slim volume he employs a strategy that requires a great deal of participation on the part of the reader: he asks many pointed, unanswered questions and makes frequent, pithy statements that beg explanation.

“I wish to speak to students,” Velásquez says, and it is clear that he has a gift for teaching that translates well on the page (xx). He leads his readers—as a teacher must lead his or her pupils—to a conclusion, rather than simply presenting them with it fully formed. It will come as no surprise, considering Velásquez’s Socratic method, that the conclusion is itself a question.

“We are what we ingest” is a prime example of Velásquez’s pedagogical approach. Answering—or attempting to answer—two questions this statement raises will help inform a review of his provocative book: If we are what we ingest, who makes what we ingest? And of what is it made?

The immediate “who” of these queries, at least through the lens Velásquez chooses, is clearly contemporary artists, of whom he picks six examples to illustrate his point: Tom Wolfe, Michael Frayn, Coldplay, Dave Matthews, Chuck Palahniuk, and Tori Amos. What their art is made of, Velásquez tells the reader, is centuries old and has its beginning in the Enlightenment itself.

At the outset, Velásquez paints a picture of modern America as the rebellious child of Protestant Christianity and Enlightenment science: “America has turned against its parents as if enacting a fated role in a Greek tragedy. America inherits and thus depends upon a genetic code, features, and dispositions it now loathes and sees as distinct from itself” (xv).

America was not always thus, and Velásquez charts the natural progression from belief in Enlightenment theology and science, despite the disjunction between the two, to outright rebellion against them. The “dogmatic character of Enlightenment religion and science,” he writes, “precipitates a metamorphosis that calls into question the authority of religion and science” (xviii). Fully embracing the Enlightenment notion of a mind-body dualism was, to Velásquez, American society’s first step in undoing itself. For his purposes, Velásquez equates the mind with religion and the body with science. Further highlighting the estrangement between the parents of American culture, he divides his book into two parts: science and theology.

*A Consumer’s Guide to the Apocalypse* is a mere 175 pages but should in no way be discounted for its brevity. Things are not what they seem, Velásquez repeatedly reminds the reader, and this aphorism accurately applies to his own book. In the same way that he recognizes the significance of pop culture artifacts—he calls them artifacts to begin with, thereby attributing weight to them—one should not make the mistake of thinking that this short work on popular entertainment lacks depth of analysis and the author a fluent understanding of philosophy and human nature.

Velásquez’s premise rests on the hypothesis that what “lies at the origin of the Enlightenment” is “Nothing” (xxv). We, the Enlightenment’s offspring, have placed our faith in the infallibility of mathematics and scientific evidence; we have treated science and religion as if they cannot cohabitate, as if religion somehow robs science of its objectivity. Accepting the emphasis the Enlightenment placed on science, we relegated belief in a higher power, a moral order, and ultimate significance to the past. By doing so, says Velásquez, we started down the path to making our very existence subjective and have ended up deconstructing ourselves into meaninglessness.

Yet the persistence of apocalyptic and metaphysical themes in popular entertainment indicates that human beings are inherently spiritual creatures who are living with the consequences of having attempted to divorce what is inextricably linked. The current trends in pop culture

betray the conflict this attempt has bred in us—a conflict that stems not from a “battle between the secular and the religious . . . but a consequence of the curious affinity between our secularism and our religiosity” (xiv, emphasis in original). America as a society, by embracing the Enlightenment’s (mis)conception of a mind-body dichotomy—of the separation of science and religion—outwardly denied this affinity. But, according to Velásquez, proof that the affinity between secularism and religiosity does exist saturates pop culture.

Focusing in part 1 on science, Velásquez employs Tom Wolfe’s novel *I Am Charlotte Simmons*, Michael Frayn’s play *Copenhagen*, and the band Coldplay to demonstrate that the notion of science without any religious element is an illusion. With each example, Velásquez reveals more of the spiritual void precipitated by the disconnect between the mind and the body, until he finally invokes Coldplay’s desire to go “back to the beginning of time,” where “we might discover . . . a purpose perhaps, or an initial impetus that could explain what we are and why we are here” (64).

Putting religion at the center of Part 2, Velásquez explores these deeper longings as well as the contradictory desires that drive us to religion even if only to deride it, using as examples Chuck Palahniuk’s novel *Fight Club* and the music of Dave Matthews and Tori Amos. Although *Fight Club* promotes a masochistic kind of nihilism and Matthews and Amos scorn the Christian faith, Velásquez understands all three to actually acknowledge the existence of good and evil, and thus of a moral standard—and standard setter—outside of human influence or denial.

For each of the six artifacts, Velásquez offers a thoughtful, intriguing assessment. Suffice it to say, nothing will stand in for his well-crafted critique and lyrical prose. His is not a book a person should get the gist of and skip reading altogether. A review of *A Consumer’s Guide to the Apocalypse* should, and hopefully does, point the reader directly to the volume itself and to Velásquez’s wonderfully Socratic style.

Considering Velásquez’s contemplative approach to his subject, it should not be surprising that his use of the word “dissolution” to describe what he sees happening in America is neither a veiled condemnation of American culture’s immorality nor an assertion that entertainment plays a part in degrading the American public. He is wise enough to see that entertainment originates within us—or at least within the artists of our age—and is not what forces us into depravity. Pop culture, to Velásquez, is

something to be mined for insight into our condition. One of the most noteworthy and praiseworthy features of Velásquez’s writing is his painstaking accuracy in language. He does not use words lightly, and those he uses are rich in etymology and connotation. By choosing the word “dissolution,” he points to an actual breaking up or dissolving of American society—a tireless and lamentable negation of our own being—of which he finds evidence in popular entertainment.

We negate our own being by denying the “transcendent aspirations of the soul” and existing without reconciling the unsustainable separation of our minds from our bodies (102). Velásquez orders the artifacts—from Wolfe’s depiction of the death of the soul to Amos’s obsession with the person and death of Jesus Christ—to reflect a yearning for the reconciliation he argues we all experience. The order of the artifacts also subtly hints at finding a way back from the “Nothing” to which the Enlightenment has brought us—if we take a good look at the origins of our dissolution, can we put ourselves back together again? “Is there some power,” Velásquez asks, “some force in the darkness that I can call forth in an effort to free myself from the light and the perpetual and agonizing thoughts enlightenment brings?” (87).

Even the structure of the book offers a trajectory for our return because it serves as an analogy of the relationship between science and religion: Velásquez places science first because it can only go so far before religion or faith must take over. “We search for answers because we are creatures of speech,” Velásquez says (144). Far from turning evangelical about Christianity or any other religion, Velásquez simply affirms the uniquely human need for answers to questions about our existence—answers we have heretofore proven inept at providing for ourselves. But if we move from nihilism to skepticism, can we figure out what it means to exist?

It is refreshing to explore Velásquez’s brilliant observations and not see him slip into easy, moralistic diagnoses. He is inherently a teacher, and his focus is aptly on prompting serious self-reflection in his audience. On reaching the end of the book, rather than being confronted with a neatly packaged answer to or disdain for American society’s numerous problems, the reader will find himself or herself instead left with the most haunting of questions, one that is hinted at in the subtitle of the book and may just be the most significant one he or she will ever answer.

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## UNITED STATES

### Politics and Public Policy

Eisenach, Eldon J., ed.

#### **The Social and Political Thought of American Progressivism**

Indianapolis, IN: Hackett

331 pp., \$26.95

ISBN 0-87220-785-4 cloth

ISBN 0-87220-784-6 paper

Publication Date: March 2006

This volume in Hackett's American Heritage Series excerpts the social and political thought of leading writers during the Progressive era from 1890 to 1920. As Eisenach, professor of political science at the University of Tulsa, notes in his brief introduction, three criteria guided his selection of pieces. First, the excerpted works had to demonstrate durability and impact. The chosen works have remained in print for many years, in some cases for decades, and their influence can be traced to the development of reforms during the Progressive Era in American society and politics—and to developments that have occurred since then.

Second, although the selected works are quite broad in scope—addressing issues in democratic practice, political economy, law, social welfare, religion, labor practices, and women's rights—they each highlight a characteristic feature of much Progressive thought: the power of reformed or newly created institutions to ameliorate the most pressing problems of American life. It is worth remembering, in respect to this point, that many of the dominant institutions of American society today are the creations of this period—the modern university, the department store, the museum, the civic orchestra, urban parks, philanthropic organizations, and the think tank, to name but a few. Much of contemporary civil society originated in this period.

Third, the selected works pay particular attention to the impact of Progressive thought on changes in the political parties of the era. Progressives were an extraordinarily diverse group, many of whom gave little attention to politics. However, at its heart, the Progressive Era was driven by a zeal for political reform at the national, state, and local levels. Progressives frequently criticized the party system for impeding reform even as some were infiltrating political parties to advance their goals or forming a new Progressive Party to supplant the old.

This book is most suited to graduate-level courses in twentieth-century American thought. Readers will appreciate having a companion history of the period to examine in detail the issues that drove Progressivism in the early twentieth century. Because so much of Progressive writing has assumed familiarity with the controversies of the

era, readers without this familiarity can easily get lost in the thickets of the works assembled in this edition. Eisenach lets the Progressives speak for themselves with little comment, though he provides helpful bibliographies of critical works on the period that give the student a basis for understanding the impact of Progressive thought on American society. For my money, I would have liked a concluding chapter by Eisenach to summarize the major critiques of Progressivism over the last thirty years or so.

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Lichtenstein, Nelson, ed.

#### **American Capitalism: Social Thought and Political Economy in the Twentieth Century**

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

378 pp., \$24.95

ISBN 0-8122-3923-7

Publication Date: April 2006

In this book, fourteen scholar-critics raise and extend the scope of intellectual discussion of the American cultural-social-political-economic system. The short title, *American Capitalism*, wrongly suggests a discussion focused on economics. Fortunately, the subtitle indicates the book's important and wide-ranging contribution to a discussion of post-New Deal liberalism and its conservative challenges. Furthermore, seventy pages of footnotes add to its scholarly value.

This collection originated at a conference at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Nelson Lichtenstein, professor of history and director of the Santa Barbara Center for Work, Labor, and Democracy, edited the essays—most of which are about twenty pages long. Most of the writers are historians; none are economists, which is a major benefit to substance and readability.

Two essays on sociologist Talcott Parsons and economist John Kenneth Galbraith indicate a shift in thinking away from capitalism as an economic system to capitalism as a cultural-social-political system in transition to some new, still amorphous modernism.

Howard Brick notes the influence of Parsons ("The Structure of Social Action," 1937) on anthropologist Frank Boas, sociologist David Riesman ("The Lonely Crowd," 1950), and social forecaster Daniel Bell ("The Coming of Post-Industrial Society," 1973). Brick describes how Parsons and sociologist Alan Gouldner developed structure-function theories of "convergence" with both the Soviet Union and America, "alienating mass society organized around economic production" (67).

Galbraith follows a tradition set by Thorstein Veblen, Adolph Berle, and Gardiner Means, according to Kevin Mattson, who praises "the lessons that Galbraith taught his fellow citizens: that environmental and aesthetic concerns should matter as much as profit, and that planning in the name of community control is a noble task" (107). However, Mattson notes that "liberals like Galbraith failed to understand the power of ideas to the right of their own" and finds "an almost mystical grounding" for Galbraith's concepts of "countervailing power" and "the civic sympathies of the new class" (108).

Clark Kerr's Ford Foundation-financed 1950s social-science project with John Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and Charles Myers resulted in a global social-economic-political theory of economic development in "Industrialism and Industrial Man" (1960), according to Paddy Reilly. However, Reilly notes Kerr's "wildly inaccurate" predictions of life in a knowledge-based society were the result of the "excessiveness of Kerr's optimism" about the future of the "multiversity" in 1963's "The Uses of the University" (86).

The essay by Nils Gilman treats prolific management theorist Peter Drucker as an antiauthoritarian legitimizer of professionalism in management practices who wanted "to put business-friendly conservatism on a firm theoretical and political footing" (130).

C. Wright Mills, influenced by Max Weber, "offered a radical critique of American society" in "White Collar" and "The Power Elite," and "became a hero to the New Left in the 1950s," according to Daniel Geary (135), who also notes that Mills criticized his fellow sociologists for failure "to consider total social structures" (141).

Afro-Caribbean Marxist historian C. L. R. James in the 1940s and 1950s developed a theory of state capitalism that is applicable to both the Soviet Union and the United States, according to Christopher Phelps. James's enthusiasm for popular culture encouraged his followers "to approach society from the bottom up, keeping their ears open for rumblings of alienation and resistance in popular consciousness, leaving no sphere of culture or society unexamined, an approach that helped to transform social history and cultural criticism" (174).

Perhaps the most provocative essay in this collection is "Feminism, Women's History, and American Social Thought at Midcentury" by Daniel Horowitz. He discusses four Marxist feminist writers—Carl Degler, Eleanor Flexner, Aileen Kraditor, and Gerda Lerner—who in their early works "saw capitalism as a force that oppressed women in ways that only socialism could remedy. By the 1960s they paid much less attention to the power of economic forces and

focused instead on gender, patriarchy, and race" (191). Further, Horowitz writes that "[t]he ideological constructs that replaced Marxist feminism, with its emphasis on capitalism, involved gender, the family, and the organizations that connected private and public life" (209).

The last section, "The Rise of the Right," consists of four essays. Juliet Williams criticizes libertarian Friedrich von Hayek when she writes, "Among political theorists today, Hayek is generally treated as little more than a Cold War crank—that is when he is given consideration at all" (215). Still, Williams gives credit to "his willingness to broach the taboo subject of the embarrassing failure of U.S. democracy to live up to its potential" (226).

Alice O'Connor notes that post-World War II politics found philanthropic "foundations proved useful targets for right-wing Republicans as emblems of the growing power of an increasingly liberal establishment" (230). The attack on such foundations as Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Russell Sage "underscores the degree to which postwar battles over capitalism were being fought on cultural as well as political and economic grounds" (230). There is irony, too. In lessons learned from the liberal foundations, right-wing, probusiness foundations like Olin, Scaife, Coors, and others vastly increased "a conscious program of ideological reorientation that sees American capitalism as a cultural as well as a political and economic project" (248).

The 1950s and 1960s labor policies of General Electric Vice President Lemuel Boulware were not simply anti-union but were part of a general probusiness attack on "the entire system of postwar liberalism," according to Kimberly Phillips-Fein. She writes that General Electric also "pursued an aggressive antilabor, antiwelfare state politics, joining businessmen together in defense of capitalism and the free market" (270).

The final essay, "Godless Capitalism" by Jennifer Burns, pits "fiery, procapitalist ideologue Ayn Rand," atheist author of the best-selling novel *The Fountainhead* (1943), against William F. Buckley Jr., author of *God and Man at Yale* (1950), and conservative Catholic intellectual Garry Wills. With the notable exception of Alan Greenspan, conservatives generally deny atheist Rand entry into the pantheon of probusiness gurus.

Burns ends her essay with a final sentence that makes the book hard to resist: "If capitalism could be moderated, or its ultimate logic inhibited by the strictures of Christianity, then it could fit right in with motherhood, apple pie, and other emblems of the American way" (290).

MARKLEY ROBERTS  
Washington, DC

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Roth, Timothy P.  
**Morality, Political Economy and American Constitutionalism**

Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar  
194 pp., \$98.46  
ISBN 978-1-84542-524-1  
Publication Date: July 2007

There has always been considerable debate as to the true intentions of the founding fathers regarding the U.S. Constitution. Some may say the debate can be simplified by focusing on two broad but different theories. One such theory—popularized by the liberal audience—suggests that the founding fathers designed a document to be interpreted differently as time and circumstances change to reflect new needs and conditions in the United States. Another general theory is advocated by conservatives who suggest a more traditional and narrow interpretation of the Constitution, one that suggests little need for rapid changes and urges more reliance on a traditional interpretation of its words. The author, Timothy P. Roth, seems to agree with the latter, more conservative theory. Obviously, it is a matter of opinion as to which view is correct, but Roth has labored intensely to weaken the validity of the liberal view.

The general theme of *Morality, Political Economy and American Constitutionalism* is that the United States has deviated from the intent of those individuals who wrote the Constitution (viii). Roth suggests that this has resulted in a danger to the republic from an overreliance on what he describes in the book as modern liberalism. The motivation of those who advocate a broad interpretation of the Constitution seems to be the result of a preoccupation with obtaining their own preferences in spite of the original intent of the Framers. This preoccupation "has caused us to ignore, to delay or to forget what the Founders understood" (viii). The author strongly suggests that the founding fathers regarded the Constitution as "fixed" and rejected the idea of a "living" or "adaptive Constitution" (144).

Perhaps there is merit to the author's view. Yet it is a view not shared by everyone, especially those who see value in the liberal interpretation of the Constitution. In fact, a strong case can easily be made for those who view the intent of the Framers in a different way. Society is not static and governments must react to the reality of a situation at a given time. In many cases it may be argued that indeed there is room for different interpretations of the exact meaning of the Constitution, and that this is a natural by-product of human endeavors. Therefore, the advocates of conservatism should be pleased upon reading this work, whereas those who see value in liberalism will be challenged.

It is obvious that the debate over the meaning of the Constitution will continue for some time. Regardless of whether one

agrees with the general conclusions of the author, the views expressed in this book would be more readily understood and appreciated by those who have considerable prior knowledge of the notable philosophers who are alluded to in the work. For this reason, I do not recommend this book to those who have not had this valuable prior intellectual experience. On the other hand, for those who are looking for a strong intellectual analysis of a point of view serving their conservative cause, this work should receive their praise and admiration.

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Gerston, Larry N.

**American Federalism: A Concise Introduction**

Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe  
208 pp., \$59.95 cloth, \$23.95 paper  
ISBN 978-0-7656-1671-5 cloth  
ISBN 978-0-7656-1672-2 paper  
Publication Date: March 2007

In *American Federalism: A Concise Introduction*, professor of political science Larry N. Gerston puts himself into the minds of students by sculpting a book with an underlying mantra asking, "What does federalism mean to me?" In pursuing this question, he aims to create a text that is intellectually interactive and user-friendly.

Academics may ask: "Yet another text on federalism?" Gerston has a ready response: "It is simply a problem of necessity." He asserts that the myriad available texts on federalism simply do not relay how truly interesting the topic is. And boring texts fail to engage students.

Gerston uses nine chapters divided under four categories to explain federalism. It is a nonlinear technique that is far from a topic-oriented approach. For example, part 1, "Creating a New Nation," consists of two chapters that provide brief sketches on various political theorists and descriptions of a number of fundamental concepts such as separation of powers and the tension between liberty and equality. Further, Gerston introduces four characteristics of federalism—consensus, cooperation, conflict, and chaos—as elements that typically interact with issues, values, and policymakers in distinct patterns or combinations. Between the first two chapters, he reiterates the question of "What does federalism mean to me?" and answers it by providing contemporary examples of how federalism surrounds us daily in terms of political consequences, economic impacts, and social outcomes.

Gerston uses the remaining three parts of the text to address the process of organizing

a federal system of government, the dimensions of modern federalism, and the dynamics of continuity and change. In part 2, he examines the process of organizing a federal system of government within a framework of various American traditions, agents of institutional change such as the courts, president, and Congress, as well as informal pressures on the flow of power including parties, interest groups, the bureaucracy, and public opinion.

Devoting three chapters to exploring the dynamics of horizontal and vertical federalism, he concludes that, though boundaries of various relationships within federalism, such as those between the national government and the private sector, were probably beyond the anticipation of the those attending the Constitutional Convention, these new applications do not denigrate their roles. Additionally, he questions whether contemporary conditions in which states pursue different approaches to similar issues are now challenging Daniel Elazar's noted observation that states are the glue of American federalism.

Gerston leaves us with a final section that reassures us that the dynamics of continuity and change inherent in American federalism existed even before the Continental Congress. He predicts that rapid changes in medicine and technology will create new issues as federalism is further defined.

Gerston's affable writing style and nonlinear interweaving of contemporary and historical examples accomplish his goal of providing an engaging text. Although a comprehensive index is provided, the text does not provide a glossary of terms, a given in traditional introductory resources. In addition, terms are occasionally introduced but not defined, such as "checks and balances," in chapters 1 and 2. This in itself is not necessarily a weakness but merely a recognition that the author has vowed to produce a text that is intellectually interactive. Accordingly, *American Federalism: A Concise Introduction* is an excellent choice for high school instructors hoping to not only teach the topic but also motivate students to understand the significance of it in their daily lives.

JULIE WALTERS

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Lang, Kevin

**Poverty and Discrimination**

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press  
408 pp., \$60.00  
ISBN 978-0-691-11954-0  
Publication Date: January 2007

In *Poverty and Discrimination*, economist Kevin Lang sets out to guide readers through a multidisciplinary body of

social science research that examines the determinants of poverty in America, paying particular attention to the role of racial discrimination. Although perhaps not a household name in political science, Lang has published extensively in labor economics and has considerable expertise in both areas. Not surprisingly, therefore, Lang's approach to these well-researched topics is different from the typical course reader a political scientist may consider in this area. Written from the perspective of an economist, *Poverty and Discrimination* tells readers that much of the research examining poverty and discrimination is "designed to further a political agenda," and the rest is "just not very good" (9). The author's motivation is to review research on poverty and discrimination as an "objective arbiter," highlighting what we think we know and how confident we can be with that research knowledge. The intent is to leave readers better equipped to read empirical research and evaluate social policy.

Before the book turns to chapters that review various empirical studies of poverty and discrimination in America, the first chapter discusses why students of social policy may find disagreement among policy analysts and why they may also find published results that lack precision. Here Lang touches on the limitations of statistics in the absence of randomized experiments and the role of values in shaping how we come to understand that benefits of programs or policies outweigh the costs. Although brief, such material does pave the way for instructors to discuss the challenges of collecting data, measuring social phenomenon, and establishing causality in poverty research. Also handy is an appendix to this first chapter that offers an intuitive treatment of basic statistical principles such as standard errors, confidence intervals, and statistical significance.

The remainder of the book is divided into two sections: one examines research on poverty, and the other examines what empirical researchers have to say about racial discrimination. Lang devotes the second chapter to methods of defining poverty and the consequences of decisions over how to define poverty. This chapter covers many important topics in relatively short passages that are characterized by easy-to-follow examples and tables. Subsequent chapters in this section briefly review poverty policy and track poverty trends at the end of the twentieth century. The author then turns to several different topics commonly integrated into scholarly discussions of poverty: labor market factors and policies; family composition; concentration of poverty; education; and welfare reform. Lang's treatment of labor market policies in chapter 5 is illustrative of the book's approach to poverty studies. After discussing several economic factors that contribute to growing wage inequality in America, Lang explains the extent to

which minimum-wage laws, job training programs, and welfare-to-work programs improve earnings and work outcomes through a basic review of prominent research on these topics. He concludes the chapter by noting that mixed results and a lack of easy answers to remedy observed economic inequalities characterize the research.

The latter third of the book focuses on issues of discrimination. As with the first section on poverty, this portion of the book begins with a chapter that highlights key theories of discrimination. Again, this discussion of discrimination is delivered from the perspective of an economist, but it is accessible to a range of readers. Two chapters examine racial discrimination in the labor market and in the educational system, and primarily explore differences between whites and blacks. Although Lang finds evidence of discrimination in the studies he cites, he also points to skill differences between blacks and whites as key to explaining the gaps in earnings between race groups. Examining several studies that use test scores to reflect cognitive ability, the author then discusses evidence suggesting that environmental factors such as differences in parenting practices and low-quality schools may in part affect the magnitude of test score gaps observed between whites and blacks.

In the concluding chapter, Lang provides policy recommendations for the readers. This is the shortest chapter in the book and the "least important chapter" according to the author. Much of the chapter reiterates key problems and inequalities that are obstacles to reducing poverty and increasing opportunity in America. Readers will not be surprised, as the text in general avoids making any firm policy prescriptions. Nevertheless, Lang discusses the importance of modest increases in minimum wage standards, addressing health insurance costs, reasonable expectations for training and education programs, and early-childhood programs. Consistent with the tone of the book, Lang's recommendations are rooted in a careful reading of the research and stop short of a well-developed set of policy initiatives to address poverty.

Unlike edited volumes that tackle a variety of topics through chapters written by many contributing authors, I found the single voice of *Poverty and Discrimination* brings coherence to the discussion of economics, program evaluation, demographic patterns, and public policy. *Poverty and Discrimination* follows a similar format from beginning to end. Each chapter is composed of a number of shorter headings that touch on topics related to the primary theme of the chapter. Chapters typically review the findings of several dozen studies by prominent researchers in economics, sociology, public policy, political science, and developmental psychology. Each chapter concludes with a list of additional readings by an equally diverse group of authors and a set of discussion questions to guide

further inquiry into these topics. For instance, in the chapter on family composition, there are headings addressing single parenthood, teen motherhood, declining rates of marriage, and the intergenerational transmission of poverty. The end to each chapter contains useful discussion questions, data sources, and citations that are well suited for classroom settings.

*Poverty and Discrimination* is designed for undergraduate and graduate courses, and the focus is on policy research related to poverty. Although I had not read all the studies the author discusses or cites throughout the book, the discussion of the many studies that I know is accurate, fair, and insightful. Even though most undergraduate or graduate-level seminars on poverty and social policy in America spend some time discussing research design methodology across a number of academic disciplines, it is difficult to find a text that complements those discussions. This text fills that void. Instructors with a background in economics or quantitative policy research will find it easier to adopt this text in courses that blend such training into studies of poverty, race, and social welfare policy. It is my impression that the text may be best used in conjunction with other readings or materials, rather than as the lone text for a course. For example, instructors may want to complement Lang's text with readings that touch on the normative or political issues relating to poverty and discrimination, or highlight other methodological approaches to the study of poverty. This is a welcome addition to course readers on poverty and social policy in America, and political scientists should consider the text either for class or as a tool for class preparation.

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Leaming, Barbara

**Jack Kennedy: The Education of a Statesman**

New York: W. W. Norton

509 pp., \$26.95

ISBN: 978-0-393-05161-2

Publication Date: May 2006

Author Barbara Leaming, who has previously written biographies of Orson Welles and Katharine Hepburn, turns her attention to America's thirty-fifth president, John F. Kennedy, in her present volume. Her intention is to demonstrate the "deep and lasting influence of British history, literature, and values on an American leader" (11). She accomplishes this with extensive use of archival documents, personal interviews, newspaper accounts, and secondary sources. The format of presentation is a linear biography of Kennedy's life.

The early portion of Kennedy's life was beset by a series of medical maladies that would reoccur for the rest of his years in one form or another. However, this afforded him the time to read. He became familiar with the works of Winston Churchill, particularly the history of World War I as the Churchill leader saw it. Later, Kennedy would follow Churchill's career closely and attempt to adopt his strategy for dealing with communism in the post-World War II era.

John Kennedy would be exposed to British society and politics in several other ways that had a great impact on him, according to Leaming. First, Kennedy's father, Joseph, served as the American ambassador to Britain for three years. His views against Britain fighting a war with Germany contrasted greatly with those of Churchill, who steadfastly opposed Hitler's aggressive militarism during the late 1930s. Second, John made several trips to Britain before World War II and afterward as a member of both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Third, John was introduced to a circle of British students by his sister Katherine—otherwise known as "Kick"—and his friendship with one of these acquaintances, David Ormsby Gore, would last the rest of Kennedy's life.

After his election to the presidency, Kennedy interacted often with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Ormsby Gore, who—after being appointed British ambassador to the United States—was involved in regular consultation with the Kennedy White House on foreign policy matters, including the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. A month before Kennedy's assassination, the U.S. Senate ratified a nuclear test ban treaty between America and the Soviet Union, a step toward peaceful coexistence with the Communists, and one that Churchill had advocated since the end of World War II. Leaming depicts this achievement as demonstrating Kennedy's willingness to support something in which he believed—regardless of the political costs.

*Jack Kennedy: The Education of a Statesman* may be compared with two other recent biographies of Kennedy: Robert Dallek's *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917–1963* (Little, Brown, 2003) and Michael O'Brien's *John F. Kennedy: A Biography* (Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's, 2005). Both books are significantly longer than Leaming's and devote more space to Kennedy's presidency than does Leaming's book. Although all three works use diverse sources, Leaming's is alone in its extensive use of British archives and interviews with British officials.

Leaming's scholarship has added to the depth of understanding about John F. Kennedy. In addition to familiar information about Kennedy's life and presidency, Leaming contributes some little-known but fascinating facts, such as the nastiness

of the rivalry between John and his older brother Joe Jr.; the manner by which John's Harvard senior thesis was significantly revised to fit subsequent events and to be made suitable for publication; Jacqueline Kennedy's reliance on methamphetamines during her husband's years in the White House; the behind-the-scenes antagonism between Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy, a by-product of the 1960 campaign; and how Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev approved the plan for the installation of offensive missiles in Cuba as a way to force American concessions on Berlin.

Of course, Leaming's book is most valuable for its unique perspective and theme—British influence on John Kennedy's thinking and actions. There is no debate about Kennedy's reverence for Winston Churchill or his personal and professional affinity with David Ormsby Gore. If there is a weakness in Leaming's approach, it is to minimize the impact that Americans had on many of John Kennedy's actions. For instance, John's brother Robert is regarded by most historians as his closest confidant. Further, members of his administration and congressional allies deserve more credit than they received from Leaming for Kennedy's initiatives and legislative successes. However, taken together with biographies such as those by Dallek and O'Brien, Leaming's work provides a more comprehensive portrayal of John F. Kennedy's upbringing and political career.

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Mandle, Jay R.

**Democracy, America, and the Age of Globalization**

New York: Cambridge University Press

163 pp., \$65.00 cloth, \$22.99 paper

ISBN 978-0-521-88589-8 cloth

ISBN 978-0-521-71365-8 paper

Publication Date: January 2008

It is difficult to find two political issues that generate more heat than economic globalization and campaign finance. In this book, Jay Mandle of Colgate University combines the two topics in a thought-provoking manner.

Mandle's core argument is straightforward. Globalization produces economic inequality in advanced democracies. Inequality is primarily explained by the inability of those adversely affected by free trade to develop the skills to compete for high-paying jobs in a fundamentally transformed economy. Highly skilled workers' abilities are in high demand and their incomes rise; low-skill workers' wages stagnate. Government policies (such as job retraining) are capable of redressing inequalities by providing

displaced workers with the skills necessary to compete in the new economy. Those countries that have implemented these policies exhibit lower levels of economic inequality. The United States, which has done little to assist workers affected by globalization, exhibits the highest levels of economic inequality among advanced democracies. Mandle argues that the failure of the United States to address economic inequalities can be traced to the campaign finance system. Elected government leaders rely on campaign contributions from the “winners” in the global free market—not from the “losers”—and are not likely to legislate solutions that benefit those without a voice in the political system; that is, those who do not make contributions. The answer, he argues, is public financing of campaigns. Putting both groups on a level playing field will amplify the voices of the many Americans who have been hurt by globalization, and it will produce legislation that promotes their interests.

The book’s structure follows this line of argument. In chapters 1 and 2, Mandle discusses the economics and politics of economic inequality. Chapter 3 focuses on the socioeconomic bias in the campaign finance system and chapter 4 recounts the campaign reform efforts of the past. In the final two substantive chapters Mandle links globalization to the decline of trust in government and then he discusses why public financing is the appropriate approach to stimulate government policies that address economic inequality. In the final chapter he lays out a political strategy for the public-funding cause.

This book is not a research-oriented work and is most appropriate for lower-division college students and more general readers. The author relies on secondary sources and does not engage in primary data analysis. All of the tables in the book are drawn from others’ research, and the prose relies heavily on the research and arguments of others. Researchers interested in globalization, economic inequality, or campaign finance will not find anything new here.

The contributions of the book are twofold. First, the book unites two heretofore separate research areas in a lively and interesting fashion. It is left to researchers to empirically test many of the arguments Mandle makes, however, because he does not do this himself. Second, it provides an ancillary textbook for lower-division courses in American politics that will generate considerable classroom discussion. Students will appreciate the lively and concise writing style and the provocative arguments that Mandle makes throughout the book. This volume is highly recommended for faculty looking for such an ancillary text.

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Holland, Matthew S.  
**Bonds of Affection: Civic Charity and the Making of America—Winthrop, Jefferson, and Lincoln**  
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press  
336 pp., \$26.95  
ISBN 978-1-58901-183-0  
Publication Date: October 2007

Although modern political theory’s endeavor might be to “replace charity with justice as the first virtue of social institutions,” Matthew Holland, a political scientist at Brigham Young University, contends that “bonds of affection” steeped in Christian charity are essential to American political theory and practice (11). He specifically illustrates this contention with thorough case examinations of John Winthrop, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln.

As much as Winthrop, according to Holland, evokes and practices a genuine Christian charity that leads to concern for the poor and disenfranchised, this Puritan vision also entails intolerance and punishment for those who do not abide by the community covenant. Jefferson will be forever associated with the so-called wall separating church and state, but Holland points out that in his First Inaugural Address Jefferson emphasizes a “national ‘circle of felicities’” that represents a quasi-Christian tempering of his Enlightenment sensibilities (149). Still, if the Puritan articulation of Christian charity is too righteous, Jefferson’s notion of *caritas*, Holland contends, is too “demystified” and secular to be an effective support for democracy (151). Finally, as illustrated by his Lyceum address, Lincoln largely invoked human reason as a bulwark against mobocracy in his early years. By contrast, Holland continues, by his Second Inaugural Address, Lincoln fully incorporates an articulation of Christian charity that is both national in scope and strives to manifest mercy—not revenge—in attempting to bind the wounds of the country at the end of the Civil War. Essentially, Lincoln captures the right relationship of Christian charity to the political realm, tempering the righteousness of Winthrop’s program, yet providing the affective bonds between citizens that rationalists like Jefferson seek but cannot provide.

Holland provides thorough exegeses of the writings of Winthrop and Lincoln. He capably shows the benevolent and generous side of Winthrop’s leadership, in contrast to past caricatures. In turn, his presentation of the transformation of Lincoln’s thinking is quite cogent. On the other hand, his elicitation of a quasi-Christian *caritas* in Jefferson’s works seems forced, almost shown as a foil to anticipate the more genuine Christian charity in Lincoln. Holland also has a tendency to make quick unsubstantiated critiques of other thinkers—such as Rawls, Nietzsche, and Rorty—who are contrary to his sensibilities.

Overall, this text will appeal to those who already believe a thick Christian religiosity is essential to the U.S. political experiment. By contrast, Jon Meacham’s *American Gospel* (New York: Random House, 2007), which contends that U.S. political leaders have consistently employed what Benjamin Franklin termed a public religion—a sensibility that is Christian in inspiration but supports both pluralism and freedom—illustrates what has actually fostered the nexus of religion and politics in the United States. As much as Holland’s text could serve as a text in an undergraduate course on American political theory or religion and politics, this volume will primarily be a valuable resource for both professors and graduate students to contest and revise their understandings and presentations of Winthrop, Jefferson, and Lincoln.

JOHN FRANCIS BURKE

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Litwak, Robert S.  
**Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11**

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press  
424 pp., \$25.00 paper  
ISBN 978-0-8018-8643-0  
Publication Date: January 2007

In *Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11*, Robert S. Litwak provides a comprehensive and tightly reasoned critique of U.S. strategic thinking about rogue states that are developing technology for nuclear weapons. The central argument is that the United States needs to abandon the strategy of regime change if it wants to negotiate seriously with Iran and North Korea to stop their nuclear weapons programs.

After September 11, 2001, President Bush focused on the dangers posed by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, casting these nations as so inherently evil and irrational that he declared deterrence and diplomacy to be useless. The U.S. president raised fears that these rogue states could share weapons of mass destruction with terrorist groups like al Qaeda. He warned that the United States might resort to preemptive military force (although he should have called the concept “preventative” force) to eliminate the growing threat from these nations. In Litwak’s words, “For the three states identified as members of the ‘axis of evil,’ the emphasis in U.S. foreign policy shifted toward regime change, since their threatening behavior of concern was seen to be inextricably linked to the very nature of their regimes” (8).

Bush’s focus on regime change, however, had a serious unintended consequence: it created an incentive for Iran and North



Korea to accelerate their covert nuclear programs to deter the United States.

Meanwhile, the Iraq war soon showed the impracticality of military invasion and occupation as a means to disarm these countries. Litwak details why even a more limited preemptive strike—namely air power to destroy weapons capability in Iran and North Korea—faces major constraints because of the lack of accurate intelligence, the potential for an environmental calamity and collateral casualties, and the risk of retaliation—if not general war.

Nor can the United States simply wait for a democratic rebellion in Iran or regime collapse in North Korea. Given the resilience of these regimes, Litwak argues, the United States' not dealing seriously with these governments is tantamount to acquiescing to proliferation.

The alternative is to switch from a strategy of "change of regime" to a strategy of "change within a regime." Litwak points to Libya's 2003 grand bargain—its decision to disclose all weapons of mass destruction and eliminate them under international supervision so that it could reintegrate into the world economy—as a possible model of rogue-state rehabilitation. Whereas the demonstration of American military power in Iraq and Afghanistan may have influenced Muammar Qaddafi's choice, the key to this success, Litwak emphasizes, was that the Bush administration reassured Qaddafi that the United States would not seek the demise of Qaddafi's regime: "The breakthrough would not have occurred in the absence of an American assurance of nonintervention—explicitly dropping the U.S. objective of regime change in the face of a profound shift in Libyan behavior" (100).

Litwak argues that the United States needs to test the nuclear intentions of Iran and North Korea through direct negotiations; to do so successfully, the United States needs to reassure these nations that it is not working toward their demise. "The Pyongyang and Tehran regimes should be presented with a structured choice between the tangible benefits of behavior change and the penalties for noncompliance. As in the case of Libya, a credible U.S. assurance of regime security . . . would be central" (331).

The conundrum is that the Bush administration—given its history of heated rhetoric—may no longer be able to credibly offer reassurance of nonaggression and noninterference to entice North Korea or Iran to abandon their nuclear programs in a similar manner. As long as there is the perception that the U.S. objective is regime change, then these "target states"—to use Litwak's terminology—have no incentive to openly disarm. At the very least, the leaders of North Korea and Iran have an incentive to hedge and maintain ambiguity about their nuclear programs—just as Saddam Hussein did.

Litwak does not assume that these nations can be persuaded to give up their

nuclear ambitions, or in Iran's case, its links to terrorism. He proposes that analysts must look at the "strategic personality" of each target state (its history, its regional neighborhood, the beliefs of its leaders, the interests of core domestic coalitions, the economic health of the nation) to attempt to discern its incentives for building weapons of mass destruction and supporting terrorists, and whether such decisions can be changed. At the same time, Litwak reasons, the United States needs to remove itself as a reason for the target state to build nuclear weapons to test the potential for change in these countries.

If the conditions for a Libya-like grand bargain do not yet exist, then the United States must fall back on a strategy of containment and seek interim agreements. The trick is to reassure the target state that the United States is not interested in its demise, but also to deter the target state from certain behavior. Litwak believes it is necessary for U.S. officials to "unambiguously lay down a deterrent red line—the threat of regime-changing U.S. counter-response if a state transfers nuclear materials or capabilities to a nonstate terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda" (334–35). Sending a clear message—that regime change is not the U.S. objective unless the state engages in certain threatening behavior—is the challenge. According to Litwak, "In the current era, policy-makers attempting to integrate force and diplomacy face no greater challenge than managing the tensions between deterrence and reassurance" (121).

Litwak concludes with a chapter about the nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration, Litwak believes, placed too much emphasis on the "nightmare scenario" of collaboration between rogue states and terrorists. The more likely route for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials or other dangerous materials would be leakage from inadequately secured sites in places like Russia or Pakistan. He also believes it more likely that terrorists would use conventional means to create mass casualty attacks.

Overall, Litwak provides detailed case studies of U.S. relations with two former rogue states—Iraq and Libya—and two rogue states of ongoing concern—Iran and North Korea. He incorporates a rich description of the internal dynamics within each of these nations, trying to tease out lessons from Iraq and Libya to apply to Iran and North Korea. He also explains with clarity the litany of possible strategic approaches. As such, this book serves as an excellent resource for serious students of U.S. foreign policy and security studies and as a must read for practitioners.

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## THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Rodden, John, ed.

### **The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell**

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
218 pp., \$80.00 cloth, \$24.99 paper  
ISBN 978-0-521-85842-7 cloth  
ISBN 978-0-521-7507-9 paper  
Publication Date: July 2007

This slim Cambridge Companion consists of sixteen relatively brief essays on the life and writings of George Orwell. The editor is John Rodden, who has written or edited five previous books on Orwell and has an essay of the "what Orwell means to me" variety in this collection. The contributors are a somewhat varied lot: five of them are British, two Canadian, seven American, and one unidentifiable. Given the point made in several of the essays that Orwell resonates most strongly these days with citizens from the former Soviet Empire or of China, it is unfortunate that there were no contributors from these parts.

It is notoriously difficult to classify Orwell into any current academic niche, and the disciplinary background of the contributors reflects that fact. Thus, there are eight who profess literary studies, there are five historians, one political scientist, one sociologist, and two who seem best classified as public intellectuals—the category to which Orwell himself is most often assigned in this volume. As one of the essays in this volume argues, literature and history scholars mostly cite Orwell (and presumably read him) in the period 1976–2003, followed by psychology, political science, and sociology scholars. Nonetheless, as the editor and coauthor suggest with the title of their introductory essay, "A Political Writer," this would have been a better volume if there had been a stronger representation of political theory, for that is what Orwell was doing in his most famous and most remembered books—*1984* and *Animal Farm*.

As is true in most of the Cambridge Companion series, the authors have all proven themselves in the Orwell industry by having published extensively on him before. Rodden has worked hard to give the volume some coherence and structure. After the opening overview statement, the volume clusters into three sets of essays. Two essays set the context by discussing Orwell's England and his biography. The next nine essays concentrate on Orwell's writings and life beginning with his early efforts to capture "the truths of experience" (43) in what we might call "participant journalism"—his *Down and Out in Paris and London*, for example—through to his last and most famous work, *1984*. In between are essays on his realist novels

of the 1930s; his essays; his relation to the Left, especially as formed in his experiences during the Spanish Civil War and chronicled in *Homage to Catalonia*; his commonsense patriotism, especially as developed in “The Lion and the Unicorn”; and individual essays on *Animal Farm* and *1984*. The last set of essays presents Orwell’s legacy—what we have made of his work and what we ought to make of his work—with the volume concluding with a spirited statement by Christopher Hitchens, “Why Orwell Still Matters.”

Unlike many collections of essays, this one has the virtue of some coherence. It certainly succeeds in giving the reader an impression of Orwell’s life and an introduction to his corpus. One question a reader might have coming to this volume is whether Orwell is of sufficient stature to warrant a Cambridge Companion. Unfortunately the volume does not answer that question. A premium has been put instead on scope and coverage rather than depth and analysis. One can thus imagine another, deeper book on Orwell, but this one accomplishes its chief goals quite well.

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Brown, Wendy

**Regulating Aversion: Regulation in the Age of Identity and Empire**

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

268 pp., \$29.95

ISBN 0-691-12654-2

Publication Date: September 2006

In this volume, Wendy Brown recasts Herbert Marcuse’s treatment of “repressive tolerance” in terms more postmodern than that of critical theory. Brown contends that liberalism uses tolerance as a tool to assert its acultural character. In so doing, liberalism marginalizes cultural identity groups that do not subscribe to liberalism and justifies transnational suppression of those nations and cultures that do not subscribe to liberal civilization.

First and foremost, Brown’s text establishes tolerance both as a “discourse of depoliticization” (1) and as a “discourse of power” (25). The integral character of toleration and liberalism is rooted in the political and religious debates of the Reformation. If Locke consigned religious values to the private or personal realm, Brown consigns race, ethnicity, and some sexual issues to this same realm. Liberalism, as a supposedly cultureless universal set of principles, both constructs and regulates ascriptive “others.” Specifically, she explains that, in the nineteenth century, women supposedly could leave their gendered identity behind in the private realm to engage—on

the basis of *equality*—the asexual rationality, virtue, and citizenship of the liberal public realm, whereas liberalism casts European Jews as a scripted race that therefore needed *toleration* for full public inclusion.

In terms of transnational issues, Brown argues that liberalism is both supposedly culturally neutral and tolerant, whereas nonliberal cultures are “disposed toward barbarism” and therefore need to be subdued (151). Although she references Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington in articulating this position, she traces this dichotomy back to Freud’s association of civilization with maturity and conscience—and organicism with primitivism and barbarism (157). Indeed, this “civilization versus Barbarianism” contrast justifies Western world domination of the world, as evidenced in the ongoing “war on terror.”

Given the reference to Freud and the overall ambience of Brown’s argument, this text could have been titled *Liberalism and Its Discontents*. In the end, she contends we need to cultivate “counterdiscourses [to tolerance] that would feature power and justice,” but does not substantiate the content of these counterdiscourses (205). Her critique of Susan Okin’s work is the closest she comes to articulating a cogent atolerant liberalism. Furthermore, repetition of key themes and overdrawn contentions—most notably her critique of the Simon Wiesenthal Center of Tolerance—undermine her narrative.

Nevertheless, all contemporary political theorists should read this superb text. Its themes are central to the debates on multiculturalism and transnationalism raised in Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations*, Bhikhu Parekh’s *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, and Will Kymlicka’s works. Brown’s thesis also provides a salient counterpoint to Michael Mann’s contention in *The Dark Side of Democracy* that the pursuit of democracy in organic societies can be a recipe for genocide. Ultimately, it is a shame that Brown writes just for academics and graduate students, for the book needs a wider readership, à la Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations* and *Who Are We?*

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Deudney, Daniel H.

**Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village**

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

391 pp., \$35.00

ISBN 0-691-11901-5

Publication Date: December 2006

The title of this book is an almost overly clever play on words. The power avail-

able to states, both for use against other states and against their own citizenry, has grown by leaps and bounds in the past several centuries. Unrestrained power is a threat to both security and liberty. Hence, bounding power requires the bounding of power (28).

Deudney’s goal is to “rethink the basic traditions and concepts of international theory” (3). His focus is on “the main line of Western theorizing about the relations among security-from-violence, material contexts, and types of governments” (3). The book thus proceeds on two planes at once. A republic is a political arrangement that limits governmental power, thereby providing both security and liberty to citizens. A world of republics would be one in which wars were few or even nonexistent, thereby providing security from international violence without infringing on freedom. Deudney’s claim is that both issues can and should be addressed within the same body of theory, which he calls republican security theory. Such an approach, he argues, offers a richer and more insightful analysis of the security from violence problem, both domestically and internationally, than realism and liberalism, which Deudney sees as “traditions” embedded within the broader study of republics and republicanism (6).

Deudney concedes in his preface that his book “is mired in analysis of terms and labels” (xv). Alas, he is right. He is not content to use a single term when several can be used interchangeably. Republican security theory, to cite one example, is also referred to as “structural materialist security theory,” “security restraint republicanism,” and “republican international theory.” A by-product of this proliferation of terminology is that the book is a very difficult read. It is far beyond an audience of undergraduates, and even first- and second-year graduate students are likely to find it tough going.

Deudney argues that a new approach is required because realists and liberals both employ too narrow a conception of material context, which leads both to downplay or even lose sight of what Deudney calls “violence-interdependence.” Deudney’s concept of violence-interdependence is very similar to what realists call offense-defense theory, yet the latter gets just one short paragraph, which hardly does justice to the scope and subtlety of the work done by Stephen Van Evera, Thomas Christensen, and Jack Snyder, among others. Thomas Schelling’s theory of interdependent decisions is not mentioned at all, and neither is Daniel Ellsberg’s concept of “critical risk,” even though it captures a great deal of what Deudney means by violence-interdependence. Omissions such as these are especially glaring because Deudney repeatedly accuses other authors of using an impoverished or truncated conceptual scheme.

This is a very ambitious work, but on balance the results it achieves fall short of the goals it sets.

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Sharansky, Natan

**The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror**

New York: Public Affairs  
336 pp., \$26.95 cloth, \$14.00 paper  
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ISBN 978-1-58648-354-8 paper  
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Unfortunately, the failed policies with which *The Case for Democracy* is associated will likely lead many to avoid this rich, interesting, and well-developed work. Sharansky, a former Soviet political dissident and prisoner and a former member of the Israeli Knesset, cleverly and effectively weaves his interesting personal experiences with political theory and foreign policy in an effort to establish an argument that relates a lack of political freedom with terror. The resulting work is accessible to students, scholars, and even the motivated layperson.

Based on his experiences as a Soviet citizen turned political dissident turned political prisoner and his experiences in Israeli politics, Sharansky hypothesizes that freedom is the key component to undermining the terror and tyranny produced by fear societies (societies based on coercion rather than consensus). Theoretically, fear societies are weakened by the need to constantly repress the domestic constituency; therefore, any effort at appeasement from free societies is a welcome respite. Following this logic, free societies should put pressure on fear societies to change internally rather than try to cooperate with them for the sake of international security. The international pressure applied to the regimes in fear societies will either lead to overextension and collapse or internal reform (or some combination thereof). Sharansky examines the historical record, most closely the Helsinki Accords and the fall of the Soviet Union, and offers evidence of the causal mechanisms outlined above.

Sharansky couches his argument in terms of what he coins “moral clarity,” which is certain to alienate audiences that have a different perspective of U.S. foreign policy in the latter stages of the Cold War. For example, while many would agree with the assertion that “all people desire to be free . . . freedom anywhere will make the world safer everywhere,” fundamental disagreement with Sharansky is likely to emerge based on assertions that “democratic nations, led by the United States, have a

critical role to play” and “the world is divided between those who are prepared to confront evil and those who are willing to appease it” (17). The problem with Sharansky is not so much that he is wrong, but that his assertions have manifested into the battle cry for an unpopular war led by an unpopular administration. This is unfortunate, for Sharansky has a lot to say that is worthy of attention.

As part of his stinging and self-critical examination of Israeli leadership and politics, Sharansky clearly opposes and presents compelling arguments against the notion that Arab societies are not amenable to democratic rule. Sharansky even presents a list of dissidents from the leading autocratic regimes in the region in response to the claims that there are no supporters of freedom in these fear societies.

*The Case for Democracy* is likely to continue to be controversial. However, it is important to evaluate Sharansky based on the merits of all of his arguments rather than dismiss him because of ideological disagreements. Sharansky presents a compelling portrayal of the psychology of fear societies and the repression with which they maintain power, and the fundamental good represented by freedom, especially as advanced through international agreements (such as the Helsinki Accords). In contrast to the typical neoconservative rhetoric with which this work is often associated, Sharansky articulates a far better case for democracy and freedom and is not an unabashed advocate for the use of military force to achieve such objectives. At minimum, he deserves our attention because he makes a worthwhile contribution to the literature on democracy and international security and does so in an interesting and accessible fashion.

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Breslin, Beau

**The Communitarian Constitution**

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press  
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ISBN 978-0-8018-7782-7 cloth  
ISBN 978-0-8018-8538-9 paper  
Publication Date: March 2004

Beau Breslin finds that communitarianism is on the rise, both in philosophical and political terms. He sees the movement as having started with criticisms of John Rawls’s liberal theory by Sandel, MacIntyre, and Taylor. In reviewing these communitarian works, Breslin focuses on their argument that the self is not a creation of choice but is constituted by the communal context. These criticisms are followed by a “prescriptive” communitarian movement, among whose leaders Breslin lists Mary Ann Gelson, William Galston,

and myself. This second wave—he writes—has argued for limiting freedoms, against individual rights, and for obligations to the common good and for civic virtue.

Breslin reports that both kinds of communitarians won a considerable measure of public support and also have had a significant impact on public policies. He knows how to truly hurt; he claims that President Bush and Vice President Cheney are communitarians—because they support faith-based initiatives rather than value neutrality, which Breslin associates with liberalism.

Breslin is concerned that communitarians are mainly interested with social institutions, moral culture, and habits rather than with political regimes and their constitutional elements. He rises to solve this problem by arguing that communitarians are the current followers of the anti-Federalists whereas liberals are akin to modern-day Federalists. Breslin argues that a good constitution is one that stands firm and remains “objective” in the face of whatever challenges or changes the society undergoes. In his vision, a “communitarian constitution” is one that is endlessly pliable because it is subject to changes in the values of the community.

Breslin is correct that the main communitarian project is social and not political; it is indeed more concerned with society than with the state. He falls into a trap set up by the term “community” (a trap some communitarians helped to set up) by associating communitarianism with the promotion of local and residential social entities. Actually, communities are like Chinese nesting boxes—some are built into much more encompassing ones. The nation is, after all, often defined as a community invested in a state, and is best viewed as a community of communities. Loyalties and normative commitments are split among these communitarian layers, and much of our moral and political discourse is about the relative normative importance to be assigned to each level. Thus, the question of whether a community should be free to follow its religious values (e.g., using peyote in its ritual as in *Employment Division v. Smith*) or heed a national ban on the use of narcotics can be viewed as a clash not of rights, but of the values of the national community with those of a member community. The same holds for *Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah* (the “Santeria case”), *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, and many other constitutional cases.

Above all, Breslin tends to view the liberal-communitarian debate through bifocal lenses. One is either a Federalist or an anti-Federalist; either in favor of rights or communal values. However, as his interest in the Constitution should have revealed to him, we actually deal merely with various combinations of these two elements. In the same vein, the current communitarian debate is about how much weight to accord to various common goods (such as security, public health, and environmental protection)

and how much to grant to individual rights (especially to privacy). No one in his or her right mind holds that one category should be vacated for the sake of the other.

I did my best to provide a fair review of this book, although I deeply regret that the author claims that, like Michael Walzer, I hold that local communities should be the ultimate arbitrators of what is morally right. I dedicated a whole chapter in *The New Golden Rule* to argue that such a communitarian position is untenable. I hold that human rights, for instance, are universal values that all communities must honor. These communities are free to foster particularistic values and social responsibilities as long as they do not violate such universals. A sound debate focuses on how much license to give communities, and never treats them as the social entities whose values trump all others. Otherwise a Nazi community would be in the right, as well as one that lynches anybody who has a different color than that of the members.

AMITAI ETZIONI

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Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth

**Why Arendt Matters**

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press  
240 pp., \$22.00  
ISBN 0-300-12044-3  
Publication Date: October 2006

Reading this volume gives one the feeling of taking part in a séance where Elisabeth Young-Bruehl is channeling the spirit of Hannah Arendt to explain and even update her complex and multifaceted body of work. Although Arendt's spirit is very much alive and relevant in contemporary scholarship, she has not spawned the type of devoted discipleship characteristic of other contemporary political theorists. If someone can be said to be truly Arendt's disciple though, it is Elisabeth Young-Bruehl. Young-Bruehl is the type of disciple that Arendt would have wanted, a clear-headed scholar who unpacks Arendt's ideas for their inherent meaning, challenges their cogency if needed, and then relates them to the contemporary world. Although deeply appreciative and loving of Arendt, Young-Bruehl proves that there will never be Arendtians because Arendt's writings encourage true openness in dialogue and judgment.

Young-Bruehl was a student of Arendt's at the New School for Social Research and is most well-known in political science for her 1982 biography *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*. In *Why Arendt Matters* (a much smaller volume), Young-Bruehl does not condense or dumb down her biography. Rather, she attempts to explain Arendt's ideas and then imaginatively relate these ideas to the current state of domestic and international politics.

Young-Bruehl writes that "here, I am only going to wonder about what she might have thought, and do so by engaging—wondering about—how and what she did think, as evidenced by her writing and conversations" (15–16). In her interpretations, Young-Bruehl succeeds in doing what political theory should do—that is, combining philosophical insight with political relevance.

The book is organized into four main sections. The introduction offers up an overview of Arendt's relevance, specifically focusing on the controversy over her phrase "the banality of evil" and her relationship with Martin Heidegger. Amazingly, over the course of this small book, Young-Bruehl touches on most of the major aspects of Arendt's writings and clears up many misunderstandings about her concepts. The first chapter focuses on totalitarianism, the second chapter on human action, and the third on the thought process (corresponding to Arendt's books *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, *The Human Condition*, and *The Life of the Mind*), all the while relating her ideas to recent and contemporary world events. Obviously, no one should expect to agree with all of Young-Bruehl's interpretations of Arendt or of recent political developments. I would contend that Young-Bruehl, a practicing psychoanalyst, overemphasizes how Arendt's ideas relate to emotions and the inner workings of the mind, neglecting Arendt's stress on the public realm and the limited importance of the mind in directly affecting political events.

If one can fault the book for something, it would be that it is far too brief. Often the references to actual political events could be fleshed out much more. This could have been a tome that served as the definitive work on Hannah Arendt. Although much else has been written on Arendt, it always seems to miss what she is saying in some fundamental way, or it uses her work as support for some other preconceived argument. In the end, however, it is hard to completely fault Young-Bruehl when her book leaves one wishing that she had written more. As of now, *Why Arendt Matters* stands as the indispensable book for anyone interested in Hannah Arendt.

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Hirschmann, Nancy J., and Kirstie M. McClure, eds.

**Feminist Interpretations of John Locke**

University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press  
352 pp., \$35.00  
ISBN 978-0-271-02953-5  
Publication date: February 2007

This book forms part of the series Re-reading the Canon, edited by the philosopher

Nancy Tuana, which consists of anthologies of essays about canonical (all male, so far) philosophers written by feminist philosophers or philosophers willing to interpret these canonical authors through a feminist lens. This anthology focuses primarily on Locke's political writings, although one of the essays delves into his medical writings on midwifery, and two of the essays rely heavily on his remarks on language in his "Essay on Human Understanding" to shed light on political and economic matters. The editors of this book are Nancy Hirschmann, the distinguished feminist political theorist at the University of Pennsylvania, and Kirstie McClure, a feminist political theorist at the University of California, Los Angeles, and author of a previous book on Locke's theory of rights.

The book begins with three classic feminist appraisals of Locke from the late 1970s to early 1980s: articles by Mary Shanley on the marriage contract, Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman on the public/private distinction in Locke's liberalism, and Melissa Butler on the liberal roots of feminism in Locke. A very useful afterword essay, written specifically for this volume to bring the reader up to date on these feminists' current appraisal of Locke's ambiguous contribution to feminism, follows each of these articles. Although it is impossible to summarize these rich articles in this short review, it is fair to say that most of the thinking on Locke's connection to feminism concerns a central ambiguity: on the one hand, Locke considers women to be endowed with the reason necessary for political equality with men, yet, on the other, he subordinates women to their husbands within the family. Jeremy Waldron's essay, "Locke, Adam, and Eve," interestingly argues—via Locke's theological interpretations in the *First Treatise*—against Pateman, writing that this is a fundamental inconsistency in Locke that shows his basic ambivalence about women, rather than some fundamental patriarchalism.

Whereas roughly half of the essays begin from the mainstream interest in Locke's contractarianism, giving this a feminist reading, the other half begin from specifically feminist interests. Terrell Carver's "Gender and Narrative in Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*" illuminates the different forms of masculinity that Locke elevates or assails. The essay contributed by Hirschmann critiques feminist omissions of class analyses in Locke, although the essay by Joanne Wright on midwifery and wet nurses belies this neglect. Carol Pech's bizarre article on what she calls Locke's fetish about money and Linda Zerilli's article about the rhetoric of compact offer more heat than light in this reviewer's opinion.

This book is written for Locke scholars and feminist theorists, and would be very useful for those who have an interest in the

development of social contract theory in the seventeenth century. As a philosopher, this reviewer would have appreciated articles on some of Locke's other philosophical ideas, such as his theory of personal identity—a topic that might have interested feminist political theorists as well. This volume is unique in its collection of feminist interpretations of Locke, and as such is an important contribution to the feminist rereading of the canon of philosophy and political theory.

ANN E. CUDD

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Smith, Gregory Bruce

**Martin Heidegger: Paths Taken, Paths Opened**

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield

333 pp., \$32.95

ISBN 978-0-7425-5283-8

Publication Date: December 2006

The opening of *Martin Heidegger: Paths Taken, Paths Opened* includes a Leo Strauss quotation that identifies the guiding spirit and impelling motivation that drive the book: "The only great thinker in our time is Heidegger. Heidegger is the only man who has an inkling of the dimensions of the problem of a world society." Following Strauss's lead, Gregory Bruce Smith, a latter-day product of the Chicago school of political philosophy, proposes to strike a path toward a political protophilosophy that Heidegger identifies but does not take. The opening that Heidegger provides comes from his phenomenological insistence that all of philosophy must grow out of the ineluctably concrete, temporal, and historical situation into which we happen to find ourselves "thrown." Philosophical interrogation naturally springs from the deep roots that we, simply by living, have already sunk in the prephilosophical, pretheoretical experiences of everyday life and praxis. In short, philosophy is already rooted in and so "naturally" grows out of factual life. "Every great thinker thinks but one thought" (16)—this is Heidegger's single and central thought (his primary word for it is "Da-sein"), and Smith therefore repeats it in its various nuances and forms throughout his book as the "thrown," pretheoretical awareness that is the ineluctable starting point of all thought; "an immersed, intensely lived experience . . . of Being as the historical

facticity of concrete humanity" (36); and as primary everyday experience surcharged with originary depth phenomena that "naturally" call for thought. In short, "All Thinking is Thrown and rooted," i.e., historically situated (270).

Opposed to this natural depth of human experience is the artificial matrix overlaid across the surface of the globe by modern technology, the ultimate fruit of the subjective and theoretical constructions developed by modern philosophy since Descartes. For Heidegger, this World Wide Web of the technological "Ge-Stell" (best translated etymologically as "synthetic compositing") constitutes the ultimate "oblivion of be-ing" (i.e., a total alienation from our elemental natural experiences that constitute the root of thought). But Smith emphatically rejects Heidegger's full account of the "history of the oblivion of Being" that finds the seeds of modern constructivism already being planted by Plato's objective idealism. Instead, in a move again reminiscent of Strauss, he recalls the concrete interrogations of the Socratic Plato to counter the later Heidegger's "vaporous musings" in a series of "postmetaphysical thought experiments" that tend toward an abstract sense of "Beyng" (207–213). Socrates clearly showed that what is already embedded in everyday life are moral, religious, and political phenomena, and that, accordingly, the underlying issue of all basic questioning is the issue of the Good. The protophilosophy embedded in everyday life is therefore a political philosophy.

The primacy of the Good in a shared everyday life means that the primary questions are "How shall I live?" or "What is the best life?" The fact that we come into the world as beings with others prompts the further question, "How shall we live together?" or, to put it another way, "What is the best regime?" Since this regime must take shape in an already historically sited community, the underlying ethos of that community—its distinctive manners, customs, long-standing usage, and tradition of practice—must be taken into account in any overt projection, say, by way of a written constitution, of the future course of that historical community (283).

At this point, it might be noted parenthetically that Smith seems unaware of the centrality of ethos (50, 76, 81n.5, 113)—as *Brauch*—in Heidegger's conception of the idea of "being." But he does relate "regime" to Heidegger's concept of world, without noting that the world as a network of purposive relations is telically woven together ultimately "for the sake

of" human existence—i.e., for the Good of Da-sein—thus aimed at establishing at least a suitable regime for human life. He also seems unaware that Heidegger explains the foundations of the ethical-political relations that constitute a regime—in this instance Kant's "kingdom of ends"—in a series of deconstructions of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* from 1927 to 1930. But he does appreciate Heidegger's sense of poetry as a mode of revelatory truth and includes the poetic, along with the phenomenological and the hermeneutical, as an essential element of his political protophilosophy, regarding it as "central to Plato's emendation of Socrates" (282).

One final Straussian element creeps into Smith's characterization of Heidegger's philosophical rhetoric as self-consciously tactical and "esoteric." This latter description fits when it is applied to Heidegger's allusive style of "hinting" and "intimating" phenomena that are necessarily concealed (100), but it assumes a more sinister tone when we are told that Heidegger deliberately obfuscates his misadventure with National Socialism by inventing the "reversal canard," a radical turn in his development that purportedly severs all his ties with Nazism (36). In fact, if we are to believe Smith, Heidegger undergoes no radical development at all, for all of his unique insights are "already lurking" in his student juvenilia: "Heidegger did not spend his life turning this way and that way. He spent his life working out the key premises that were always there *in embryo*" (42, emphasis in the original). His seeming commitment to Catholicism and Aristotelian scholasticism in the juvenilia is merely tactical for the sake of securing funding for his university education, his commitment to neo-Kantianism is merely tactical to get his dissertation past Rickert, his commitment to phenomenology is useful in obtaining Husserl's patronage, etc. Heidegger's dissembling knows no bounds, spilling over into his life at convenient occasions, like when he feigns illness to dodge the draft. At this point, this gross portrait of a rhetorically calculating, opportunistic, manipulative, vulgarly self-promoting, petty human being begins to deflate before well-established facts, both biographical and archival. Heidegger, despite all of his character flaws and oft-proclaimed reputation as a "schlauer Bauer" (cunning peasant), deserves a less cynical press agent.

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